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This language is frequently quoted by writers on the subject. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court used substantially this same standard in
Thauer v. Gaebler,8 decided a few yeare before Rogers v. Hill. This
was a derivative action by minority stockholders to recover a bonus of
$500 to an officer for services performed during a preceding year, and
to enjoin an increase in salary voted by the board of directors for two
of its officers. The Court stated:
"There must be a clear abuse of discretion, fraud, or bad faith,
resulting in spoliation of minority stockholders and ruin to the
corporation."9
It is implicit in the case that on any strong appeal for relief the
court might hold director action to be an abuse of discretion as a matter
of law. It should be further noted that this whole question is a matter
regulated by decisional law. The writer could find no statute applicable
to the situation in the instant case.
FREDERICiK A. MILLER
Taxation-Family Partnerships- Upon the dissolution of the
Coon-Culbertson cattle raising partnership taxpayer Culbertson bought
up the basic stock with the understanding that his sons be taken into
the new business. A new partnership was formed by Culbertson and
his four sons. The sons' contributed share of the capital was repre-
sented by their note, payment of which was made partly with funds
received as a gift from the taxpayer and partly by proceeds of a loan
procured from the new partnership. The oldest son rendered some
service, although not vital in nature, to the conduct of the partnership
before being called to army service. The other sons rendered no service
because of either college or army demands for their time, although
it was their intention eventually to become active in the business. The
taxpayer distributed the profits according to the partnership agreement
and included only his distributive share in his federal income tax re-
turn. The Tax Court included the entire partnership income in the
father's return, holding that the sons did not contribute "vital services"
or "original capital" and insisting that these objective tests must be
met to establish the existence of a partnership for tax purposes., The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on a finding of intention to form a
partnership and to render future service to it.2 Held: reversed. Both
courts handed down decisions based on falacious interpretation of es-
tablished precedent. The case was remanded to the Tax Court for re-
8202 Wis. 296, 232, N.W. 561 (1930); noted in 1939 Wis. L. REv. 221; 164
A.L.R. 1133; 175 A.L.R. 594.
9 202 Wis. 296, 302, 232 N.W. 561, 564 (1930).
1 1 47,168 P-H MEMO T.C. (1947).
2168 F(2d) 980 (1948).
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consideration in conformity with principles laid down in the opinion.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. W. 0. Culbertson, Sr., and
Gladys Culbertson, 5 P-H 1949 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 72,012 (U.S. #313
1949).
The established precedent referred to is found in the Tower and
Lusthaus4 cases. It was from the following statement in the Tower
opinion that the Tax Court took the above mentioned tests:
"There can be no question that a wife and a husband may,
under certain circumstances, become partners for tax, as for
other, purposes. If she either invests capital originating with
her or substantially contributes to the control and management
of the business, or otherwise performs vital services, or does all
these things she may be a partner as contemplated by 26 U.S.C.
Secs. 181, 182... But when she does not share in the manage-
ment and control of the business, contributes no vital additional
service, and where the husband purports in some way to have
given her a partnership interest, the Tax Court may properly
take these circumstances into consideration in determining
whether the partnership is real within the meaning of the federal
revenue laws."
In the instant case the Supreme Court charged the Tax Court with
"error in emphasis." The use of objective tests was deplored and good
faith intention (n.b. subjectivity) to form a partnership was said to.
be decisive. The Supreme Court thus reverted back to the concept of
partnership as laid down in Meehan v. Valentine.- Their understand-
ing was reiterated in the following rule:
"If upon a consideration of all the facts, it is found that the
partners joined together in good faith to conduct a business hav-
ing agreed that the services or capital to be contributed presently
by each is of such value to the partnership that the contributor
should participate in the distribution of profits, that is sufficient."
This subjective test would allow a family member to contribute non-
originating capital without affecting his partnership status provided.
that such contributing member maintains a sufficient measure of con--
trol over the employment of that capital.
The chastisement of the Tax Court was not the sole reprimand in.
the present case. The Circuit Court was admonished thusly: labor-
and/or capital produce income. If neither labor nor capital come from
an intended partner, he cannot be said to have earned income tax-wise.
He is not "carrying on business as a partner" within the meaning of*
3 Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
4 Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293 (1946).
5 145 U.S. 611 (1892) where the following essential requirements for partner-
ship were listed: 1) that the parties join together to carry on a trade for-
the common benefit, 2) each party contribute property or services and, 3).,
the parties have a community of interest in the profits.
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section 181. The labor or capital, subject to exceptions not here im-
portant, must be presently6 participating in order to have income pre-
sently earned by a partner. Where the Tax Court was too strict in
the recognition of "partnership", the Circuit Court was too lax.
The Supreme Court has specifically reserved the question of
whether the profits of the partnership can be reallocated despite the
partnership agreement. Sections 181, 182 of the Internal Revenue
Code provide that the income of a partnership is to be taxed only to
the partners in their individual capacity, according to their distributive
share. What is considered the distributive share is not mentioned. As
to family partnerships,7 the Commissioner8 and the Tax Court9 have
developed what is known as the allocation theory; namely, that part-
nership profits be allocated to members in the same proportion as the
services and capital employed to produce those profits are traceable to
them. Profit ratios of the partnership agreement are ignored. This de-
vice puts into the partnership field the same concepts developed with
respect to section 22(a) by Lucas v. Earl and the Blair" case; that
income must be taxed to its source. If the Commissioner has the right
to allocate the profits on this formula, which apparently he has, it is
assured that the government will suffer no loss of revenues whether
or not an assembly of family members can be shown to be a true part-
nership. It may be, therefore, that the Tax Court has been unduly con-
cerned with the reality of the partnership entity when composed of
members of the immediate family. Certainly, their anxiety to defeat
the partnership in the first instance has raised havoc with the concept
of partnership. The instant case, however, corrects their course. This
case, although making no progress in the determination of the incident
of taxation, has reestablished the position of the concept "partnership"
in our tax law.
HOWARD H. BOYLE, JR.
6 By requiring present employment of capital or services the Supreme Court
has established an objective test. But see the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Burton, "A present commitment to render future services to a partner-
ship is in itself a material consideration to be weighed with all other material
considerations."
7 "The usual type of family partnership has the taxpayer operating or organiz-
ing a business, and giving or selling a portion of that business to his wife
or children. The aim of the taxpayer is to divide his income among mem-
bers of the family group. The profits are thus taxed to two or more indi-
viduals, rather than to the taxpayer alone." Barkan, Family Partnership Un-
der the Income Tax, 44 MICH. L. Rv. 179 (1945).
8 I.T. 3845 (1947).
9 Canfield v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 944 (1946).
10281 U.S. 111 (1930).
11 Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
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